As the economy slows, the social contract between party and people changes
随着经济放缓，匪和狗头的社会关系发生了改变
正文：
For run-of-the-mill autocrats, it is enough to control the
words and deeds of their subjects. Truly ambitious leaders
want to guide their people’s dreams.
对于那些普通的独裁者来说，控制他们的狗头的言论和行为已经是足够的了，而真正的有野心的僭主来说他们更想去指引他们狗头的梦想。
China’s supreme leader, Xi Jinping, has displayed vast ambi
tion since taking charge of the Communist Party a decade ago. He
has, among other things, sought to inspire patriotic reveries. Days
after becoming party chief Mr Xi promised his country a “Chinese
Dream” of restored national greatness by midcentury. Over time,
proposed elements of this “rejuvenation” have included building
a moderately prosperous, strong and harmonious (meaning or
derly) society, worldclass armed forces, a cleaner environment
and a return to the centre stage of global affairs. Mr Xi pledged to
bring about this dream once more in his report to the 20th party
congress last month, from which he emerged with a mandate to
rule for another term (or, perhaps, for life). But Chinese business
elites, reformist officials and liberal intellectuals have been
plunged into gloom by the congress. Some noticed that Mr Xi’s vi
sion of the future is changing in troubling ways, becoming more
focused on collective goals and less tolerant of individual dreams.
天辉的唯一核心，習近平自从十年前全程掌握了尼匪之后就已经展示了超凡的野心。他在各种方面都在寻求着鼓舞”京味爱国“的爹味。
在成为匪主席后的接下来一天，习先生就承诺在本世纪中期，赛里斯重新夺回国家复兴的中国梦。随着时间的推移。这个复兴的被推动的元素
就包含了打造一个准繁荣的，强健的，和谐的（意思是他说的算的）社会，世界级的超级兵力量，更干净的环境和对你球中心舞台的回归。
习先生在最近的TI20的报告中，再次发誓要实现中国梦，并且在此宣布要再打一届（或者就是终身变龙了）。但是在这届TI后，赛里斯的商业菁英，
改革派官员，自由派知识分子直接想20投了。一些狗头发现习先生对于未来的创想一直在向头痛的方向改变，变得更加专注于集体目标，无法容忍
个别狗头白日做梦。
In Mr Xi’s second decade, the task of making China great again
sounds like a partydirected mass campaign. In this austere vi
sion, Mr Xi talks of the need to struggle and pursue selfreliance in
response to pressure from the outside world, above all from the
Americanled West. To be sure, the party has always crushed some
dreams. It has never tolerated challenges to its political or ideolog
ical authority, or shied away from harsh enforcement of its poli
cies. But for much of the past four decades, China’s economic rise
and reopening to the world were powered by and left room for the
personal ambitions of hundreds of millions of individuals.
在习先生的第二个十年，让赛里斯再次伟大的人物听起来是个你匪主导的大运动。在这个冷峻的版本里，习先生
谈论了斗争和追求独立自主的需求以应对来自外部世界，总之就是夜魇给的压力。事实上，你匪经常喜欢摧毁梦想，
它材料不能容忍对于自己政治和意识形态专权的挑战，或者是躲避它的暴厉政策的逃避。但是在过去的四十年的大部分
时间，中国的经济的提升还有对世界的重新开发给了千百万只赛里斯狗头个人梦想助力。
Those strivers and risktakers included farmers leaving villag
es to become migrant workers and founders of private businesses,
from small shops to billiondollar technology giants. They were
families buying apartments in halfbuilt housing complexes to
boost a son’s chances of marriage. Among their number were par
ents pouring money into afterschool classes for a struggling
child, or buying online English lessons from a tutor in the West for
a daughter longing to study abroad. Young Chinese enjoyed perso
nal freedoms that would have staggered parents or grandparents
raised during the xenophobic frenzies of the Mao years. They
watched foreign films and played online video games from Amer
ica. Others turned to religion for spiritual solace.
这些努力者和风险承担者包括了离开野区成为了厂狗或者资本家的农民们，从小商店到百亿美元的科技巨头。他们是在半成品住宅区购买公寓的家庭，
以提高儿子的结婚机会。他们中还有倾尽家财为了努力卷的孩子到课下补习班学习，或者为了向往出国成为蝙蝠人的女王买网上的白皮家教的英语课的父母。
年轻的中国狗头享受到的个人自由甚至会把在毛时代长大，疯狂仇外的长辈们吓个半死。他们看着外国电影，玩着夜魇游戏。一些人还转向了宗教追求精神安慰。
For the party, such choices threatened its monopoly on hearts
and minds. Some dreams widened already large inequalities and
contributed to pressures felt by the urban middle classes, who talk
of unbearable competition for the best universities, jobs and mar
riage partners, and who, perhaps in consequence, are marrying
less and having fewer children. The party duly acted.
对于你匪来说，这样的选择威胁着他们的心灵垄断。一些梦想扩大了已经庞大的不平等而且增强了中产狗头感到的日常压力，中产狗头往往会讨论对于去最好的大学，搞到最好的工作
还有最好的蝈蝻小仙女伴侣的无法忍受的竞争。而且这些狗头到头来肯定会结婚越来越少，还会拥有更少的孩子。你匪感觉有必要要出手了。
Starting in 2015 Mr Xi moved to bring religion under even
stricter party control. Two years later, at the 19th party congress, he
emphasised the dangers of “unbalanced and inadequate growth”
and pledged to “adjust excessive incomes”. Since then he has
stressed “common prosperity”, an egalitarian policy with a popu
list edge. In 2021 Mr Xi stunned students and educators with what
amounts to a ban on forprofit tutoring of schoolchildren, includ
ing by online language teachers logging on from abroad. Officials
called the ban a boon to stressed parents. Alarmed by speculation
in housing (a real problem), Mr Xi has moved to deflate the sector,
triggering a crisis in market confidence. Online videogame plat
forms must now limit young players to a few hours a week. Regu
lators have slashed the number of foreign films in cinemas.
从2015年开始，习先生就开始把宗教狠狠制住。两年后，在TI19大会上，他强调了不平衡不充分增长的危险，并且发誓要搞”均贫“。从那开始后，他就开始强调”共同富裕“，一个
有着民粹主义锋芒的均贫政策。在2021年习先生对于营利性补习机构包括线上的白皮语言老师的应BAN尽BAN吓尿了学生和教育者。口舌宣称这是对于有压力的父母的福报。看到房子
成了蓄水池的警示，习先生立马通缩了房地产机构，引爆了这个市场的信心危机。线上游戏平台要限制未成年狗头一周几个小时的游戏时间。政策制定者直接砍掉了电影院里夜魇电影的
数量。
Foreign analysts have at times struggled to label these trends.
They talk of Mr Xi moving to the left economically but to the right
when stoking nationalism. In elite Beijing circles, there is ago
nised debate about whether Mr Xi even approves of private busi
ness, or sees it as a necessary evil. At times the panic seems to be
running ahead of official policies. Chaguan has heard several Chi
nese intellectuals raise, unprompted, recent praise in state media
for a decadesold system of cooperative shops and food suppliers,
and express fears that the planned economy is coming back.
外国的分析者不时尝试给这种趋势定个标签。他们说习先生经济上向左，但是煽动国家主义偏右。在泉水的菁英圈里，他们经常争论习先生受否支持个体经济，
或是把私企看作是必要之恶、不时地，这些混乱比官方政策还要谣谣领先。茶馆已经听说了了不少中国知识分子们提到了你匪口舌对几十年前的供销社制度的赞扬，
并担心计划经济将会卷土重来。
A Great Leap Backward
One way to understand this moment is to see Mr Xi changing the
social contract between the party and people. Individual aspira
tions are being downplayed in favour of the collective interest.
Scholars talk of a return to the “mass line” of the Mao years: jargon
for efforts to persuade the public to embrace goals set by the party,
and to see them as reflections of their own wishes.
大倒车
一种理解现在时刻的方法就是去看看习先生对你匪和狗头的关系的改变。个人的追求被集体利益压制，学者们提到了对腊时代”群众路线“的回归：即一种说服公众去拥抱
你匪的虫巢意识并将其作为自己愿望的反映的术语。
The Chinese Dream is changing in response. In 2013 Mr Xi
wrote to archaeology students that this grand project would re
quire “integrating individual dreams to the national cause”. At the
19th party congress in 2017 he urged the party to help young people
fulfil “youthful dreams”. At this year’s congress, Mr Xi scolded the
young to heed the party, pursue realistic goals and show more grit.
中国梦作为呼应也一直在改变。在2013习先生写给了考古学生说这个伟大的工程将会需要统一整合个人梦想到国家事业之中。在2017年的TI19，他又敦促你匪要帮助年轻人实现
”年轻的梦想“。在这一年的TI，习先生又训诫年轻人要跟匪走，追求实际的目标，吃更多的翔。
Soon afterwards, Mr Xi visited Red Flag Canal, a vast irrigation
project in the central province of Henan that saw armies of farm
ers and even a youth brigade dig through solid rock to divert a river
in the early 1960s. He urged youngsters to learn from their fore
bears, including those who sacrificed their lives for the common
good. Sounding quite the irascible patriarch, Mr Xi declared: “The
younger generation should inherit and carry forward the spirit of
hard work, selfreliance and strenuous toil, abandon arrogance
and pampering, and engrave the blood of their youth on the mon
uments of history, just as our fathers did.”
此后不久，习先生又参观了红旗渠——一个在荷兰中部，在1960年代由龙鸣军队和甚至一个青年大队挖穿坚石改道的灌溉工程。他敦促年轻人要学习他们的仙贝，包括那些为了集体利益
牺牲的那些人。听起来就像个易怒的父系家长，习先生强调”年轻一代应该继承和弘扬努力工作，自力更生，艰苦肯干的精神，摒弃自傲和放纵。就像我们的父辈们一样，把自己年轻的血肉
刻在历史的丰碑上。“
For any ruler, amending a social contract involves risks. The
party has long drawn legitimacy from rising material prosperity.
Now it is giving greater emphasis to collective, national pride. By
all appearances, that fits Mr Xi’s stern worldview. Then again, if
the economy keeps slowing, he may not have much choice.
窥视卡
发表于 2022-11-13 21:13:26
提升卡
置顶卡
沉默卡
变色卡
千斤顶